How
bad, how long, how likely?
By Peter de Jager
The discussion (controversy?) surrounding Y2K
preparedness lies not in any argument about how many cans of
soup per person per day, but in how many days we should
prepare for, if any? What depth of self reliance is called
for, if any? What threats to safety, if any, will Y2K
disruptions impose on us?
All of which boils down to: how bad, how long, and how
likely are Y2K disruptions? Once these most basic of
questions are answered to our individual satisfaction, then
we can make reasonable plans for coping with what we believe
might occur.
It should be obvious, but I guess it's worth
highlighting, that asking "how bad, how long, how likely"
automatically assumes a particular place. The answers to
these questions for Toronto, Canada, will differ, perhaps
greatly, from Tokyo, Japan, and Moscow, Russia.
This article will make no futile attempt to answer
anything but the most basic of aspects of these key
questions for different cities, countries or geographic
regions. Instead, it will raise the questions which require
honest answers. It will also provide a rationale behind my
estimates/opinions as to what a reasonable level of
preparation is.
Another glaring weakness of this article is that whatever
answers I can provide will be neither precise nor certain.
They will be merely educated guesses about an uncertain
future. I make no claims to omnipotence.
So, if you were expecting a 'how-to-prepare' article that
focuses on how many cans of soup, water and candles you
should be squirreling away, then this article will be a
disappointment. If, on the other hand, you were looking for
something discussing what levels of disruption are possible
and therefore, what levels of preparation are reasonable,
then you just might find this article useful.
Okay, so what level of preparation is reasonable? I'll
start with the answer to this question and then proceed to
elaborate on why I believe in my answer.
Some are suggesting 2 - 3 days is sufficient. I classify
this advice as 'South of Prudence,' but not for the reasons
some might think. It's not because I think Y2K disruptions
might be longer or shorter than 2-3 days. It's because I
think preparation plans of 2 - 3 days are not 'plans' at
all.
One could go to practically any household in the Western
world, and with only 10 minutes warning, bang nails into the
doors, cut off water and power, and even in the dead of
winter, come back three days later to find the inhabitants a
bit smelly but none the worse for wear.
A three day outage of all services would typically impose
hardships in three areas; Heating, water and food. If you
had no food at all in the house, you'd end up a bit hungry.
The water problem is solved by filling a few pots, pans and
the bathtub (assuming you had cleaned it recently). Heat for
three days?
Candles or even a makeshift oil lamp using olive oil,
combined with lots of blankets and an extended family hug
and you'll come through your 'three day crisis' with little,
if any damage, and perhaps a better understanding of why
deodorant sells so well.
The one exception, and this will keep arising as you
think about Y2K preparations, is medical needs. I would
expect anyone who had to have medication every day would
have at least three days (to a week) supply on hand at all
times
but that's an assumption on my part.
So 2 - 3 days is insufficient as a preparation plan for
any crisis. It's not really a plan, it's a decision to do
nothing.
Note: I have NOT said that 2 - 3 day outages/disruptions
due to Y2K are likely. All I've said is that a 2- 3 day
preparation plan isn't a plan.
On the other end of the scale, call it 'North of Reason'
(as a counterpoint to 'South of Prudence'), we have the
6-months to 10-year preparation plans.
I don't buy the notion of Y2K disruptions lasting 6 to
120 months. I can imagine no reasonable scenario where such
lengthy disruptions are feasible. Are they possible? Sure!
In the same way it's possible for you to get four flat tires
at the same time. That's possible, but I don't see too many
people carrying four spares in the back of their car
just in case it happens.
This is where the discussion gets heated. Such lengthy
disruptions are admittedly conceivably possible. But
preparing for everything which is 'conceivably possible' is
not the best use of our time and resources. It's possible
that a deranged killer will storm into my room in suburban
Canada, but sitting in a corner with a loaded gun wearing a
bullet proof vest each and every day
just in case?
Sheesh
Let's all agree to keep a small grip on
reality.
But, I won't just dismiss these scenarios out of hand. In
the nitty gritty details section of this article, I'll
examine long disruptions more closely.
What do I believe is a reasonable amount of planning? The
Montreal Ice Storm comes to mind. It was an unexpected
crisis, lasting 2 - 3 weeks in the dead of winter, over a
large geographic region and affecting a large metropolitan
city.
This was not a non-event. Some 20 people died, not
because they froze to death, but because they brought gas
powered generators into their homes and died of carbon
monoxide poisoning. Pity they didn't know how to use the
tools they purchased.
If your level of preparation is sufficient to cope with a
2 - 3 week disruption of services equivalent to what
happened in Montreal during the Ice Storm, then I would
state you've a sufficient level of preparation to cope with
anything Y2K might throw at you in the proactive countries
such as Canada, USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, the Nordic
Countries, Is-rael, Belgium, Hol-land, Ireland, and even
South America to a certain degree.
In other parts of the world where less preparations have
been done, then I'd increase those preparations to 4 - 5
weeks, with the notable exceptions of Russia, much of
Eastern Europe, and Italy.
What are sufficient levels for these three exceptions? I
honestly don't know. I don't have enough information to
hazard a guess.
Note: I am NOT stating that Y2K is going to create 2 - 3
week disruptions in the USA or Canada. I'm stating, very
clearly and precisely, that a 2 - 3 week level of
preparation is sufficient (a word with a different meaning
than 'necessary') to handle what Y2K might throw at you.
Here's a prediction. Some people in the proactive
countries will find 2 - 3 weeks preparation insufficient.
They will be supported, in their time of need, by those
(most of us) who find even 2 - 3 weeks of preparation
excessive. There is no one answer
Now
the big question, why do I believe that 2 - 3
weeks is sufficient?
Before we get into the nitty gritty details, a minimal
amount of personal background information is required. Why?
Because predictions of any sort are based as much on the
specific experiences and expertise of the soothsayer than
anything else. If you don't know my relevant systems
background, then how can you judge the value of anything I
say relating to systems? In particular, the failure and
repair of systems?
I started as a computer operator in 1977 with IBM. I
worked mainly in the online banking department.
I stayed with IBM about 18 months and during that time
participated in the remediation of several system failures.
I was possibly even the cause of some of them. The longest
failure I recall, lasted about 24 agonizing hours.
The causes of these problems ran the gamut of power
outages, programming errors, operator errors, hardware
failure, and smoke billowing from devices where even the
slightest suggestion of smoke was a sure sign that all was
not well with the world.
Most of these problems were handled according to
pre-established procedures, even the programming errors.
These were solved in a two-step process. The first step was
the application of a hastily concocted patch or kludge
created by some bleary-eyed, caffeine supported programmer.
(Errors of this sort always occurred at 3 a.m. and involved
the paging of a programmer usually involved in a more
constructive activity called 'sleep'). These kludges were
applied continuously until the program gave up and succumbed
to the programmer's attempts to beat it senseless.
Next morning, when the world is supposed to look better,
the programmer would sometimes, not always, examine the
program in closer detail. Sometimes this autopsy resulted in
additional changes and, if we were really lucky, some
documentation of whatever modifications the programmer had
inflicted in the dead of night.
In addition to the online banking systems at IBM, I also
worked for a large food chain, a computer timesharing
company, a bank, clothing retailer and an insurance company.
The positions I've held include those of operator,
programmer, business analyst, supervisor, system optimizer,
systems manager and general problem solver.
During 15 years of direct computer experience, I've never
encountered a computer problem that affected a mission
critical application to the point it was totally unusable
for more than three days. This does not mean that such
failures don't happen, it only means they're rare.
The scene during such a crisis was always pretty much the
same. A swat team of programmers, anywhere from 1 to 5
individuals (the largest team I remember was a total of
seven) would barricade themselves in a room until a solution
was found and then take turns babysitting the situation
until a better, more robust long-term solution was
installed. I've seen the babysitting phase last for as long
as several weeks in rare situations.
These 'life experiences' were not always painless.
Companies can lose millions of dollars per day, sometimes
per hour, when these events occur. (Of course, if you can
lose that much in a hour, you're obviously making that much
an hour when things are okay, so you can afford a few losses
from time to time.)
What's important about these situations is they occur
regularly, and seldom, if ever, make the 6 o'clock news. (A
case in point, about 50% of companies report they have
already had Y2K problems, but how many were reported in the
media? How many are you aware of? Not very many?
Interest-ing. It means that Y2K problems are already
occurring, AND people are fixing them before they become
noticeable.)
With that as necessary background, let's get to the core
of my reasoning as to why 2 - 3 weeks is sufficient.
It boils down to a very simple observation. A Y2K problem
cannot both be pervasive and hidden at the same time. Stated
differently, saying something is both 'everywhere' and
'difficult to find' is a contradiction. Again, if it's
everywhere, we can't avoid finding it.
Why is this observation important? Because it strikes at
the heart of all the doomsday scenarios. First, some
'facts':
1. Most companies, in all industries with the potential
to cause widespread outages, are now taking Y2K seriously.
2. The most important industry sectors (Financial, Power,
Telecom, Medical, Oil, Transportation, Chemical) are sharing
information freely behind the scenes. When a problem is
found, the information is shared.
3. Most competing companies inside an industry are NOT
tightly dependent upon each other in the same way the
financial community operates.
4. The Financial community is further ahead on this
problem than any other industry.
5. Failures in some industries, like Medical, generate a
very localized effect. Serious, especially to the people
affected, but not regionally or geographically
catastrophic.
Points 1, 2 & 3 combined with "if it's everywhere, we
can't avoid finding it", are the real reason long term
disruptions (6-120 months) of entire industries are no
longer reasonable scenarios.
Note, two years ago, Points 1 & 2 were not true. They
are today. Two years ago, when the majority of companies
were still ignoring this problem, it was possible to
overlook problems, but today we've achieved critical
mass.
Here are some of those scenarios: (At the core of each
scenario lurks the fear of embedded systems as well as
software problems)
Power
We could suffer total blackouts as isolated failures have
a domino affect across the landscape.
Counter Argument
a. Despite the fact that 79% of utility companies have
finished inventory & assessment (Source: Canadian
Electrical Association, Jan 21st 1999), nobody has
identified a situation that would have cut off power. The
chances of the remaining utilities coming across something
at this date are slim (not zero, but slim). The reasoning
here is plain. If 79% of the assessments failed to find
anything, it's because it's likely it doesn't exist.
b. If problems do occur, they will not be 'unexpected.'
Power companies will closely monitor their stations on Dec
31. Decisions to redirect power due to whatever failures
might occur, will not be done automatically by dumb
machines.
Y2K is unlike other problems. It's scheduled. We won't be
asleep at the wheel, we'll be expecting problems. That alone
is enough to avoid a certain percentage (Not all, not even a
majority) of problems.
Oil
We could suffer a worldwide shortage of oil, which would
cripple transportation and lead to starvation due to an
inability to transport food, etc.
Counter Argument
a. The oil industry has worked very hard to, at the very
least, communicate what they have found to each other. They
are not a shining example of 'proactive' Y2K work, but they
do realize the necessity of sharing information.
b. Most oil companies do NOT operate at full capacity.
(OPEC just cut back on oil production. That's why your gas
prices are up.)
c. The oil industry is NOT a tightly connected industry
like the finance industry. (Note: A significant failure in
the North Sea would affect ALL oil companies working there,
but would have zero impact on the Gulf.)
d. Oil can and is being stockpiled through 1999
e. There is a long time (measured in weeks) between a
problem at the well head and a shortage at the pumps.
f. If the North Sea oil field were to experience a
problem, other oil fields would increase production to take
up the slack (and make more money) The same logic holds true
for refineries.
g. But what if all the oil fields had problems? Here
we're back to the reality that if a problem exists
everywhere then we would have found it by now. The fact that
we've all woken up to the problem is the #1 reason why
system-wide problems are not possible.
h. Could there be isolated problems? The answer, without
hesitation, is of course there will be problems. But no
system-wide problems.
Chemical
Chemical plants could blow up, taking years to replace.
We'd run out of fertilizer, reducing crop yields and causing
starvation. Plant a garden!!!
Counter Argument
a. Practically all the same arguments as used for the oil
industry.
b. The notable exception is this: Chemical plants are
dangerous places. Accidents here can and have killed
thousands of people. We always have an option. We can shut
down the plant if we're not certain everything is okay. Yes,
costly. Yes, time consuming. But prudent.
c. In the meantime, stockpile chemicals throughout 1999.
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